Abstract This paper evaluates the impact of property rights, labor mobility barriers and degrees of collectivization on China's agricultural growth in . Using a semi-Bayesian stochastic frontier analysis, we find that collective production with free labor mobility and private property rights was the most efficient institutional setting.
Introduction
How institutional changes influence economic growth has been a longstanding question in the economic development literature. It is difficult to answer the question within a single country because it usually takes decades before the impacts of the evolution of institutions are realized. Acemoglu et al. (2001 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2008 partly solve the difficulty by comparing economic growth across countries with different institutions.
However, empirically, this method requires controlling for factor endowments, cultural and historical factors that also impact growth.
China's institutional changes in 1950-1978 offer an excellent case study for analyzing the impact of economic institutions on agricultural output growth. During this period, China experimented naturally with combinations of property rights, labor mobility and increasing degrees of collectivization of agricultural producers. During this period, China was a closed economy containing only heavy industry and agriculture sectors, facilitating the isolation of the effects of institutional changes in rural areas. Such characteristics empirically solve the problem of slowly evolved institutions, without the requirement for controlling variables in a cross-section of countries.
Previous work on the effects of institutions on China's agriculture has focused on the great famine in 1959 -1962 (Eckstein, 1966 Chinn, 1980; Ashton et al; 1984; Perkins and Yusuf, 1984; Lin, 1990; Kung and Lin, 2003; Li and Yang, 2005) or on agricultural productivity growth after economic reform in 1978 (Tang, 1980; Wen, 1993; Lin, 1992; Yang et al., 1992) . With the exception of Lin (1990) and Li and Yang (2005) , this literature 4 is devoid of a conceptual basis. Lin (1990) uses a game theory model that finds deprivation of the right to withdraw from communes to be a major contributor to the agricultural crisis. His analysis indicates that with the deprivation of withdrawal rights, cooperative behavior degenerated from a repeated game to a one-time game where households lack incentives to self-restraint, encouraging widespread shirking of work. He leaves the empirical test of his theory for later research. Li and Yang (2005) , using a theoretical consumption framework, estimate a production function and find that the main cause of the great famine was misallocating millions of agricultural workers to steel production during the Great Leap Forward movement in the 1958-1962 period. They find that commune withdrawal right is not statistically significant in their empirical model, contradicting the main finding by Lin (1990) .
This article systematically evaluates efficiency implications of step-wise economic institutional changes in China in the 1950-78 period through a semi-Bayesian stochastic frontier analysis. We decompose the institutional changes into four distinct sets of economic institutions: small household farming, elementary cooperatives, advanced cooperatives, and people's communes. These four institutions provide a national experiment as they vary by property rights, labor mobility barriers, and degrees of collectivization.
The analysis identifies the elementary cooperatives of 1954-1955 as the most efficient institution in the period under study. Specifically, we find that given the collectivization of agricultural production in the 1950-78 period, the first decrease in agricultural output was due to the deprivation of withdrawal rights of farm production 5 assets from collectives, creating a wedge between ownership and labor effort. However, the deprivation of withdrawal rights brought about a strict migration law under the Household Registration System created a more severe loss of agricultural output. The findings thus lend support to the upsurge of China's agriculture collectivization movement in recent years, releasing labor mobility restriction and respecting individual property rights, i.e., in the reconfiguration of elementary cooperatives. This paper reconciles the contradictory findings of Lin (1990) and Li and Yang (2005) by illustrating the causal relationship between withdrawal rights deprivation and labor resource misallocations. We find that the misallocation of labor is directly caused by the deprivation of farmers' right to withdrawal from commune under the strict migration law of the Household Registration System in 1958. 
Collectivization Movements in China: 1950-1978
After China's new regime was established in 1949, the central government adopted a Soviet-style heavy industry-oriented development strategy as its main economic objective.
In an environment of scarce capital accumulation, low agricultural productivity, and a closed economy, the agricultural sector was viewed as the logical choice for financing this strategy. However, the scattered and unorganized peasantry made collection of taxes on agricultural production difficult and costly (Lin et al., 1996) . To facilitate tax collection in order to accelerate industrialization, the central planner started organizing the peasantry into agricultural cooperatives in 1952, culminating in 1958 with public ownership of
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The coefficient of withdrawal variable may be statistically insignificant because of high standard errors led by collinearity, which is generated by including two variables with a causal relationship in a single empirical equation model such as in Li and Yang (2005) . 6 farmland and production assets and a household registration system that restricted the right to withdraw from a commune.
Following Lin (1990) , Wen (1993) The first institution, small household farming with individual-owned production assets and free labor mobility, existed in 1950-1953, when the economy was recovering from World War II and China's domestic war and the problem of lack of labor and production assets was widespread in the vast rural area. Chinese farmers voluntarily formed mutual aid groups with shared production resources to ensure the continuity of agricultural production. The scale of this collectivization is very modest, averaging only 3-4 households (Lin, 1990) .
The second institution is elementary cooperatives, in which the production labor and assets of neighboring farms were combined but remained voluntary, and individual ownership and labor mobility were retained. The number of elementary cooperatives was 
Empirical Model and Estimation
The empirical framework utilized in this study involves a stochastic frontier analysis.
One advantage of this approach over cost, supply, and profit functions is that it does not have to deal with market imperfections that affect prices. Following Coelli, Perelman and Romano (1999) , a second-degree approximation to a stochastic frontier production function can be represented by a truncated translog form given by [1956] [1957] .
To capture unobserved regional fixed effects, we divide the country into seven 3
In the reduced empirical model, it is necessary to take weather changes into account. Most of previous studies include the ratings of weather national-wide by setting best weather equal to 5 and worst weather equal to 1. We did not find detailed panel data to describe weather and therefore directly include weather in the one-side inefficiency measurement by assuming zero effect of the best weather and negative effects for any weather condition worse than the best. Inefficiency The assumption of a one-sided random variable has been a critical issue throughout development of the empirical model. The most frequently used assumptions are half-normal distribution (Aigner et al, 1977) and exponential distribution (Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977) . Under such specific distribution assumptions, the parameters could be estimated through maximum likelihood. Van den Broeck et al (1994) compute Bayes factors between these models under a Bayesian parametric framework. An advantage of Bayesian analysis is to reduce restrictions for estimation by incorporating parameter uncertainties through weighing mixtures of posterior distributions. Van den Boreck et al (1994) argues that unless the model has some special requirements, Bayesian estimation could generally be used efficiently. In the case at hand, the main disadvantage of parametric Bayesian models is to impose parametric assumptions on the one-sided inefficiency measures. The restrictions will affect the efficiency of Bayesian inference (Griffin and Steel, 2004) .
To solve the limitation, this paper applies the semi-parametric Bayesian method proposed by Griffin and Steel (2004) to estimate a stochastic frontier model. This method incorporates a Dirichlet process as the nonparametric Bayesian prior (Ferguson, 1973) into semi-parametric models using a hierarchical framework. The model is then fitted using a The issue of endogenous institution (Acemoglu, 2001; 2008) at least partially addressed because dummy variables are used to denote different institutions. Thus, changes of institutions fixed within periods and not related to changes of production.
Besides, the central planning characteristics of China's economy at that time could also help to partly eliminate the endogeneity problem in the empirical framework.
Empirical Results
The parameter estimates of the production frontier are presented in Table 3 . Table 3 shows that the mean impact of the small household farming institution (relative to people's communes) is 0.0885 with a standard deviation 0.1735. However, the impact of small household farming on agricultural output is not statistically different from that of the people's communes system. A potential explanation is that small household farming existed only in the recovery period of the war with possible discontinuities in agriculture production, making its effect be non-identifiable. Figure 2 is here.
Conclusions
This paper discusses the impact of different institutions on agriculture growth, using 
